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RECENT DECISIONS
BREACH OF WARRANTY ABANDONED

IN

SUIT

ON

PRIVITY - REQUIREMENT OF PRIVITY
WARRANTY. - Defendant, the

EXPRESS

manufacturer of a product designed to render fabrics shrink-proof,
had expressly represented in trade journals, letters to garment
manufacturers, and labels which it furnished, that fabrics finished
with its product would not shrink. Plaintiff, a manufacturer of
children's clothing, purchased fabrics so treated from several intermediate manufacturers in reliance upon defendant's representations.
Alleging that the material shrunk when subjected to ordinary
washing, plaintiff brought an action for breach of the express
warranties and joined all the manufacturers. Defendant's motion
for summary judgment, dismissing the action as to it because
of a lack of privity, was denied at Special Term and the Appellate
Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals, affirming the decisions
of the lower courts, held that the plaintiff could maintain an
action based on a breach of express warranty against the defendant- despite the lack of privity between them. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. Anwrican Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, - N.E.2d -,
N.Y.S.2d - (1962).
In New York, warranties traditionally have been considered
as arising from the contract between buyer and seller, and thus
where there was no privity of contract between the parties in a
This rule
breach of warranty action recovery has been denied.'
was firmly established by Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co.,2 and reaffirmed in Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 3 a case similar
to the instant case.
In the Turner case a defective battery

' Legal writers have argued, however, that the breach of warranty
action was in its earliest form a tort action, and still retains at least
some of its tort aspects. 1 FRUMER & FRIEDAEAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY
§ 16.03 (1960); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127 (1960); see Parish v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958).
2235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923); accord, Burke v. Associated
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 942, 181 N.Y.S.2d 800
(3d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision).
3248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); accord, Shoopak v. United States
Rubber Co., 17 Misc. 2d 201, 183 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd mem.,
10 App. Div. 2d 978, 202 N.Y.S.2d 250 (2d Dep't 1960); McDonald v.
Packard Rochester, Inc., 206 Misc. 16, 132 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1954).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.

36

purchased from a retailer, but manufactured and warranted to
be safe by the defendant manufacturer, caused injuries to the
plaintiff. In an action against the manufacturer for breach of the
warranties, the court stated: "There can be no warranty where
there is no privity of contract. A cause of action for breach of
warranty, either express or implied, is not, and cannot be, stated." 4
Some jurisdictions made an early exception to the privity rule
in the area of foods.5 A leading case is Coca-Cola Bottling Works
v. Lyons, 6 wherein plaintiff recovered for injuries suffered from
swallowing broken glass contained in a beverage bottled by
defendant, even though there was no privity of contract between
them. The court allowed recovery on the grounds of an implied
warranty of fitness running from the manufacturer to the consumer. New York, however, had been reluctant to accept this
reasoning, going so far as to deny recovery in breach of warranty
actions to the administrator of a deceased infant whose death had
been caused by drinking unwholesome milk, 7 and to the guardian
ad litem of another infant who had suffered injuries as a result
of drinking milk which contained broken glass 8 simply because
the milk had been purchased by the mothers of the infants.
While retaining the privity rule, the New York courts sometimes avoided its harsh results in the food area by use of the
principles of agency. Thus in Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores,
Inc.,9 where the plaintiff husband sustained injuries froni a pin
4 248

N.Y. at 74, 161 N.E. at 424.
5E.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799
(1939); Davis v. Van Kamp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W.
382 (1920); Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64
So. 791 (1914). New York offered the sale of food special consideration
in a very limited area. Under Section 96 of the New York Personal
Property Law, an implied warranty as to condition or fitness for a particular
purpose arises on the sale of goods only when the buyer expressly or
impliedly makes known to the seller his particular purpose and relies upon
the seller's judgment and skill. However, in the purchase of goods
normally used for human consumption from a retailer of foods, the mere
purchase, by implication, makes known to the seller the purpose for which

the articles are acquired. Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E.
471 (1918).
6145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
7 Massey v. Borden Co., 265 App. Div. 839, 37 N.Y.S.2d 571 (2d Dep't
1942) (memorandum decision).
8Redmond v. Borden's Farm Prods. Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 838
(1927) (memorandum decision).
9255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); accord, Visusil v. W. T. Grant Co.,
253 App. Div. 736, 300 N.Y. Supp. 652 (2d Dep't 1937) (memorandum

decision), appeal denied, 277 N.Y. 740 (1938); see Hopkins v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 265 App. Div. 278, 285, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788, 794-95 (1st Dep't
1942); Mouren v. Great Aft. & Pac. Tea Co., 139 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct.
1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 767, 148 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't) (memorandum decision), aff'd men., 1 N.Y.2d 884, 136 N.E.2d 715, 154 N.Y.S.2d
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embedded in a loaf of bread purchased by his wife, the court found
that the wife was acting as her husband's agent when she purchased
the bread, and therefore there was privity of contract between
the husband and the defendant store. This reasoning was also
used in other analogous situations.' 0 A major shortcoming of
this approach, however, was that while it served, under certain
circumstances, to avoid these inequitable results as between adult
members of a family, an infant was still precluded from recovering
-simply
because he could not be considered a principal."1
Several proposals have been made in the legislature' 2 to
extend a seller's warranty to employees, members of the household, and guests of the purchaser, but none have been successful.
Some of the lower courts, 13 and notably judge Starke in the
New York City Municipal Court,'41 advocated a modification of
the privity requirement, at least in food cases. In 1961 the
New York Court of Appeals, in Greenberg v. Loreni,' 5 made a
major exception to the privity requirement in breach of warranty
actions. There a child was injured by a sharp piece of metal
in a can of salmon purchased by her father; the court allowed
recovery, thus following the trend of other jurisdictions in the food
16
area.
In the American Cyanamid case, as in the Greenberg case,
the Court was faced with the barrier of privity, but decided that
642 (1956).

But cf. Vaccaro v. Prudential Condensed Milk Co., 133 Misc.

556, 232 N.Y. Supp. 299 (N.Y. City Ct. 1927) wherein a wife was presumed
to be the agent of her husband and therefore could not recover for
injuries sustained from drinking unwholesome milk, even though she had
purchased
and paid for the milk.
'0 Bowman v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165
(1955) (where two sisters live together, one is considered the agent of the
other); cf. Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 5 Misc. 2d 496, 161
N.Y.S.2d 205 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957).
1 Salzano v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d
645 (2d Dep't 1944) (memorandum decision).
12 S. Int. 3159, Pr. 3413, and A. Int. 315, Pr. 315 (1962); see 1959
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65(B); 1956 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW
REvislOx Com'x REP. (A) 27; 1945 N.Y. LE. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW
REvislO x Comns'xr REP. (A) 5-7; 1943 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW
REvisioN Comin'x REP. (J) 5-6.
13 See Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
14 See Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., supra note 10; Parish
v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1958); Starke, Implied Warranties of Quality and Wholesomeness in the Sale of Food, 137 N.Y.L.J., April 8, 1957, p. 4, cols. 1-3,
April 9, 1957, p. 4, cols. 1-3, April 10, 1957, p. 4, cols. 1-3.
1 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
161 FRummsa & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY §23.01[1][a] (1960);
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consimer),
69 Y.ALE LJ. 1099, 1106-08 (1960).
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the interests of justice demand exceptions. In the Greenberg
decision the court said: "The injustice of denying damages to
a child because of nonprivity seems too plain for argument." 17
The language used in the instant case was: "The policy of
protecting the public from injury . . . resulting from misrepresenta-

tions outweighs allegiance to an old and out-moded technical
rule of law which, if observed, might be productive of great
injustice.""'
Recognizing the tort characteristics of a breach of warranty
action, the Court in the American Cyanamid decision felt that
modern commercial practices justify abandoning the privity requirement when the manufacturer has given express warranties.
It emphasized the practice of the modern manufacturer to induce
purchases by the public through the media of mass advertising
and labels. The product is thereby warranted to the public, not
just to the immediate purchaser, who often is merely a conduit
through which the product passes to the consumer. If the manufacturer's representations prove false, the Court reasoned, then
he should be directly liable to anyone who is injured thereby.
This is not the first time the Court of Appeals has recognized
the tort aspects of the traditionally contractual warranty action.
In Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co.19 the decedent's administrator was
allowed to bring an action for breach of warranty under Section
130 of the Decedent Estate Law, 20 because "the breach is a
wrongful act, a default and, in its essential nature, a tort." 21
Significantly, in the case under discussion, the Court questions the
validity of the assumption that a breach of warranty action is
really contractual in nature. Applying this reasoning to present
commercial practice, it states:
The world of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of direct
contract; it is, rather, a world of advertising and, when renresentations
expressed and disseminated in the mass communications media and on

labels . . . prove false and the user or consumer is damaged by reason
of his reliance on those representations, it is difficult to justify the
17 9 N.Y.2d at 199, 173 N.E.2d at 775,
18 11 N.Y.2d at 13, N.E.2d at -, -

213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
N.Y.S.2d at -.

N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
An administrator or executor may maintain an action under this
section to recover damages only for a "wrongful act, neglect or default,
by which the decedent's death was caused. . . ." N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW
19277
20

§ 130.

21277 N.Y. at 34, 12 N.E.2d at 561. However, the courts have, for the
most part, considered the action basically contractual in nature. E.g., Gimenez
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934); Haller
v. Rudmann, 249 App. Div. 831, 292 N.Y. Supp. 586 (2d Dep't 1937)
(memorandum decision); McSpedon v. Kunz, 245 App. Div. 824, 281 N.Y.
Supp. 147 (2d Dep't 1935) (memorandum decision).
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manufacturer's denial of liability on the sole ground of the absence of
technical privity.22

Thus New York has made two major exceptions to the
law of privity. In Greenberg v. Lorenz, where a father purchased food from a retailer, the court determined that "at least
as to food and household goods, the presumption should be
that the purchase was made for all the members of the household," 23 and thus an implied warranty of fitness runs from the
retailer to the ultimate consumer. The American Cyanamid case
determines that when a manufacturer expressly warrants his product
by use of advertisements and labels, he
will be liable to remote
24
purchasers for breach of such warranty.
In the Greenberg case the recovery was for personal injuries;
in the American Cyanamid case, for pecuniary harm.
This is
a significant factor of the decision, especially when compared
with other jurisdictions which led the way in abandoning the
privity requirement. In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,25 the defendant
had stated that the glass in its windshield was shatterproof;
plaintiff purchased a Ford automobile, and when a pebble struck
the windshield, the glass shattered and seriously injured the
plaintiff.
The court, in a landmark decision, allowed recovery
for breach of the express warranty despite the lack of privity
between the parties. Many other jurisdictions followed suit; in
fact, few have failed to allow recovery in the case of an express
warranty, even though privity was lacking.2 6 Limitations on the
Baxter rule, however, were pointed out by the same court in
Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc.,2 7 wherein the court, denying recovery
for purely pecuniary damages caused by a defective fuel line in
a truck, stated that "the rule announced in Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co. is not apposite for the reason that, in the Baxter case the
defective windshield was an inherently dangerous condition."28

22 11 N.Y.2d at 12, -

N.E.2d at -,

-

N.Y.S.2d at -.

23 9 N.Y.2d at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S2d at 42.
24 In Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dep't
1962), decided the same day as the American Cyanamid case, the court
allowed an employee of the purchaser of a defective chair to maintain a
cause of action for breach of warranty, stating: "The problem presented,
however, does not depend on whether the plaintiff relies upon express or
implied warranty, because the very difficult question of privity or lack
thereof is present in either case as plaintiff himself was not a purchaser."
Id. at 439, 225 N.Y.S2d at 139 (emphasis added).
25 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
28 Prosser, supra note 16, at 1135-36.
27 55 Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960).
28
Id. at 389, 347 P.2d at 1059 (emphasis added). Compare MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.F_ 1050 (1912), the landmark
case allowing recovery for the negligent manufacture of a product even
though there was no privity of contract between the parties, in which Judge
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The Uniform Commercial Code also adopts the view that recovery
in breach of warranty cases should be limited to situations where
personal injuries have resulted from the defective condition of a
product.29 Thus New York, which four years before the Baxter
decision, refused in Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co.30 to
allow recovery on similar facts, has not only accepted the Baxter
rule, but extended it beyond the limitations imposed by the Dimoff
case. New York is not the first jurisdiction to allow recovery
for pecuniary damages in breach of warranty cases,3 ' but it has
taken A large step forward in abandoning both the privity and
personal injury requirements at the same time.
The Greenberg and American Cyanamid cases still leave many
questions unanswered.
Although the Greenberg case involved
injuries suffered from adulterated food, the court extended the
rule to household products also, without defining them.3 2 Moreover, this case merely allows a member of the purchaser's household to bring suit against the retailer; nothing is said about
allowing the purchaser or members of his household to proceed
against the wholesaler or manufacturer.
Another unanswered
question is whether employees
and
guests
can be considered
33
members of the household.
In American Cyanamid the Court stresses the fact that the
defendant supplied labels for distribution to remote purchasers,
Cardozo stated:

"If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably

certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger." Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053 (emphasis added).
29 Section 2-318 states: "A seller's warranty whether express or implied
extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. . . ." Thus the Code, if adopted by New
York, would limit the American Cyananid rule. The Law Revision Commission, however, does not recommend this limited version. 1955 N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw REVIsioN Comm'N REP. (C) 81. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TORTS, Explanatory Notes §402B, comment a at
44 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
30248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928).
3
- Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., Iowa -,
110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City
of Waco, 130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937);
see Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946);
Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953); cf.
Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931).
32See Thomas v. Leary, supra note 24, which may well indicate a
vast extension of the Greenberg doctrine.
33 "On logic . . . there should be no distinction between the Greenberg
case and the present case, merely because food and family were involved
in that case and a chair and an employer-employee relationship in this."
Thomas v. Leary, supra note 24, at 440, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
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implying that the express representations in trade magazines and
letters to garment manufacturers did not suffice to create an
express warranty. Under what precise circumstances, however,
the media of radio, television, newspaper and direct mail advertising,
either alone or in combination, will constitute express warranties,
in the absence of labels, is another question left unanswered by the
Court.
Thus while the Court uses very broad language in discussing
the tort aspects of a warranty action, 34 it carefully limits the
decision to its facts. The language shows an inclination to abandon
the privity requirement altogether, at least when the interests of
justice demand it; the limitations, a desire to proceed slowly. The
policy of the Court of Appeals is to "be cautious and take one
step at a time." 35 The Court seems to be unnecessarily cautious
in the instant case, for there is no apparent reason for limiting an
express warranty to situations where the remote manufacturer
supplies labels. The language of the decision indicates that the
rule will be extended, but apparently only on an ad hoc basis.

M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TELEGRAPH COMPANY DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW BY STATE JUDGMENT ESCHEATING UNDISBURSED

MONEY ORDER FuIm. - As part of its business Western Union
offers the service of telegraphing money orders. The receiver is
given a note which can be cashed at one of the company's offices.
Some of these notes are never redeemed. At other times the
receiver cannot be located and in attempting to return the money
the sender, also, cannot be located. This money is held on
deposit by the company until its true owner should appear. The
state of Pennsylvania, however, escheated these funds and its right
to do so was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proceeding
lacked due process since Western Union was compelled to relinquish the monies without any assurance that it would not again
be subject to an escheat action by any other state in which it also
did business or that it would not be held liable to a party not

34 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
3 Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213
N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961).
1 Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617

(1960).

